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Abstract. Many authors have considered that the notions of paraconsistency and di-
aletheism are intrinsically connected, in many cases, to the extent of confusing both
phenomena. However, paraconsistency is a formal feature of some logics that consists in
invalidating the rule of explosion, whereas dialetheism is a semantical/ontological posi-
tion consisting in accepting true contradictions. In this paper, we will argue against this
connection and show that it is perfectly possible to adopt a paraconsistent logic and reject
dialetheism, and, moreover, that there are examples of non-paraconsistent logics that can
be interpreted in a dialetheic way.
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1. Introduction
Logics are often accompanied by philosophical interpretations. For example, several sys-
tems of modal logics talk about possible worlds and relations of accessibility, intuitionistic
logic is connected with constructive proofs, and relevance logics are linked with situations.
In this regard, the role of philosophical interpretations has been highlighted by Richard
Routley. For instance, he has affirmed that “a satisfactory sentential logic should include
however, especially if philosophical applications are intended, a relevant implication” [28,
p.305], justifying the adoption of a formal system in virtue of some particular philosophical
interpretation. In the more particular context of paraconsistent logics, the discussion about
philosophical interpretations has centered on whether there are dialetheia or whether there
is simply contradictory evidence. Concerning the first case, many authors have considered
that the notions of paraconsistency and dialetheism are intrinsically connected, in many
cases, to the extent of confusing both phenomena. However, on the one hand, paracon-
sistency is a formal feature of some logics that consists in abandoning at least the rule of
explosion. On the other hand, dialetheism is a semantical/ontological position consisting
in accepting true contradictions. In this paper, we want to focus on an issue that has
not yet been sufficiently explored: how a logical theory is connected to its philosophical
interpretations. In particular, we will argue against the existence of a close relationship
between both elements. In other words, we would like to conclude that there is not any
single canonical philosophical interpretation for logical systems. We will display that it
is perfectly possible to adopt a paraconsistent logic and reject dialetheism. Also, we will
provide examples of non-paraconsistent logics that can be interpreted in a dialetheic way.
In sum, we will show that there is no any necessary connection between paraconsistency
and one philosophical interpretation. In order to do so, firstly, in Section 2 we are going to
explain the main ideas developed around the notion of dialetheism. Next, in Section 3 we
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will summarize the different definitions given in the literature of paraconsistency. In Sec-
tion 4 we will present the distinction between pure and apply logics, and the relevance for
our main purposes. we are going to present the distinction between pure and apply logics,
and the relevance for our main purposes. In Section 5, we will argue that it is perfectly
possible to adopt a paraconsistent logic and to be non dialetheist. In Section 6, we will
show that it is possible to embrace a dialetheist position without adopting any paracon-
sistent logic. Moreover, we will present some examples of non-paraconsistent logics that
are explicitly committed with inconsistent objects. Therefore, we will distinguish between
paraconsistency and inconsistency. Finally, we will conclude with some closing remarks.
2. Dialetheism
Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions. Many philosophers have
adopted this thesis. For instance, this perspective was defended by Priest (e.g. [19], [22])
and also by Routley, (e.g. in [28] and [29]), among others. Usually, a sentence is called a
dialetheia if, semantically speaking, is true and false, or expresses a true contradiction.
Two thesis are involved in the dialetheism:
Definition 2.1. Dialetheism is the thesis that some contradictions are true.
Definition 2.2. Dialetheism is the thesis that some sentences are both true and false.
There are several motivations to endorse a dialetheist view, among them: semantic and
other paradoxes linked with self-reference, many of our beliefs, legal codes, Meinongian
objects, Hegelian and dialectic philosophy, rationality, and scientific theories such quantum
mechanics, among others.
As we have seen, the formulation of the dialetheist thesis involves the concept of truth.
But it is well known that there are different notions of truth and that, therefore, there are
different ways of adhering to the dialetheism. What is at stake is whether dialetheism brings
with it certain ontological commitments. True contradictions could imply a commitment
to the existence of inconsistent entities as their ontological counterparts. For example, if
there were good reasons to adopt the correspondence view about truth, then there would
also be good reasons to connect the dialetheism with the existence of entities of a specific
nature. Then, when A is a dialetheia, there would have to be entities in virtue of A and
¬A are both true. Berto [7] analyzes this option in detail. And leaving aside the question
about the correspondence theory of truth, Priest offers good reasons to accept inconsistent
entities in the natural and social world ([22, Ch. 12 and 13]) However, some sentences could
be both true and false, but this result does not imply any ontological commitment. Such
an option seems to be available if a deflationary position about truth were adopted. In this
line, the sympathy with the dialetheism is compatible with the rejection of the existence
of inconsistent entities. Or at least, with neutrality about this question. Beall seems to
adopt this position in [6]. In both cases, that is, if it remains only at the semantic level or if
the additional step is taken to the ontological level, this decision will not be a consequence
of supporting the dialetheism. As Priest affirms [22], this point of view is not necessarily
committed to any particular conception of the notion of truth.
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Dialetheism, the view that some contradictions are true, does not commit
one per se to any particular account of truth. A dialetheist who holds a
correspondence account of truth will hold that there are inconsistent facts
(whatever, in the end, this is taken to mean). One who holds a verifica-
tionist/pragmatist account of truth will hold that some contradictions are
warranted by the evidence, and so on.
Notwithstanding this, the defense of a particular approach to truth seems to bring with
it different ways of adopting the view according to which there are true contradictions.
In addition, beyond the ontological and semantic aspects, there is another important
distinction that involves the scope of the dialetheist thesis.
Definition 2.3. Trivialism is the view according to all contradictions are true.
It is clear that trivialism implies dialetheism. But at least it is not obvious that the
other way around works. A dialetheist typically only holds that some (and, usually, some
specific cases as paradoxes) sentences are dialetheia. Nevertheless, it is not mandatory to
this view to support that all sentences are true and false. Distinguishing normal cases of
special cases in which a sentence can be true and false seems to be one of the proposals to
be achieved.
In short, dialetheism is a family of semantic/ontological approaches. There are many as-
pects both ontological and semantic that can change from one position to another. Options
within the real or the possible or various ways in which we might understand the truth of a
contradiction determine a variety of approaches that possess critical philosophical disagree-
ments1.
3. Paraconsistency
As well as the case of dialetheism, there are also several motivations to adopt a paracon-
sistent logic. One of them is to deal with inconsistent information. The idea is not to reject
theories or sets of sentences in virtue of their inconsistency, but to deal with them employ-
ing a logic that is tolerant to contradictions. As we will formally pose below, a theory is
explosive if, from inconsistent premises, it is possible to entail everything. Paraconsistent
logics are not explosive.
Another possible motivation is dialetheism: true contradictions should not cause trivial-
ity. IIn both cases, the key is that paraconsistent logics allow for the capturing the capability
of reasoning with inconsistent premises without entailing everything. Since dialetheism is
committed to accepting true contradictions, it seems that a paraconsistent notion of logical
consequence allows them to prevent triviality. By contrast, prima facie, an explosive notion
of logical consequence is not a suitable instrument to treat inconsistent information2. For
instance, one of the definitions of paraconsistency is the following, from [32]: “A logic L is
paraconsistent if it can support inconsistent non-trivial theories”.
1For some further discussion of these issues, see [23].
2This thesis, as plausible as it sounds, we think is not true. In Section 6 we will discuss it in detail.
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More formally, a logic L is paraconsistent if the inference of explosion is invalid in it.
This means that
(Explosion) A,¬A L B3
is not valid.
It is important to note that there are at least two notions of paraconsistency involved in
this definition. It is important to note that there are at least two notions of paraconsis-
tency involved in this definition. Following Ripley [27], one could refer to the following as
conjunctive paraconsistency and collective paraconsistency :
Definition 3.1. (Conjunctive paraconsistency): A consequence relation ` on a language
L is conjunctively paraconsistent iff there are wffs A,B ∈ L such that A ∧ ¬A 0 B
Definition 3.2. (Collective paraconsistency): A consequence relation ` on a language L
is conjunctively paraconsistent iff there are wffs A,B ∈ L such that A,¬A 0 B.
Only in a logic for which A ∧ B ` C implies A,B ` C does collection-paraconsistency
imply conjunction-paraconsistency (see Ripley [27, p.772]).
However, beyond these options, paraconsistent logics are closely related to other kinds of
non-classical logics [U+FFFD]specially to relevant logics and many-valued logics. Let[U+FFFD]
note from the above definitions that paraconsistency is a property not only of the notion
of logical consequence, but also of negation. In other words, the presence of some kind of
negation is necessary for this definition.
Nevertheless, as Omori argues in [12, p.825] “the understanding of the only connective
involved in the explosion, namely negation, is not shared among paraconsistentists”. How-
ever, what is clear is that the negation involved in any paraconsistent system is not classical
(in the sense of truth and falsity are exhaustive and exclusive). But it is not completely
clear how to identify only one positive condition: maybe paraconsistent negations are not
exclusive 4.
However, all of these definitions of paraconsistency are negative. As Urbas [32, p.344]
notes:
it serves negatively to disqualify explosive logics as clearly inadequate for
reasoning in inconsistent situations, but it does nothing positively to illumi-
nate those that remain. All that it tells us about paraconsistent deducibility
is that a certain inference is rejected, leaving it otherwise entirely open which
inferences are to be accepted.
3Here, we are using , but depending on the context, we can speak in terms of syntactic consequence.
Actually, in this section we will use ` and in Section 6 we will use this and other definitions replacing  or
` with ⇒.
4The most radical point of view on this point has been adopted by Slater. In [31] Slater analyzes the notion
of contradictoriness to try to show that negation in paraconsistent logics is merely a subcontrary forming
operator and not one which forms contradictories. There are many answers to this argument. For instance,
see Oller in [16] or Restall in [24], among others.
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Notably, da Costa, in his pioneering work on C-Systems, [11, p.498], suggested that all
paraconsistent logics must meet four conditions:
• The principle of contradiction ¬(A ∧ ¬A) must not be a theorem.
• From two contradictory formulae it must be impossible to deduce an arbitrary
formula.
• The logic must have a simple first-order extension.
• The logic must contain as much of classical logic that does not impede the fulfillment
of conditions 1-3) as possible.
Condition 2 is the rejection of explosion. But the other conditions add some information
(not only negative) on what a paraconsistent logic could be.
But even if it is not so important to give a positive definition of what is a paraconsistent
logic, there are other problems about these definitions in term of failure of some kind of
explosion. Some scholars – such as Urbas or Fjellstad – consider that this strategy to
characterize a paraconsistent logic is that it is neither very restrictive nor substantive.
For example, it is important to note that there are several logics such as Johansson’s
‘Minimal Calculus’ [13], a positive fragment of intuitionistic logic, in which although explo-
sion is not a valid rule, a special instance of explosion such as A,¬A L ¬B is. Other cases
are some da Costa’s logics that can avoid the general formulation of explosion but deliver
A,¬A L B → C.
This is not the best news. We could want to exclude not only absolute explosiveness,
but also explosiveness which is specific to particular connectives. Maybe, it could be a
good idea to try to add conditions to exclude this type of logics. So, as Priest points
out ([18, p.4]): “paraconsistency, in the way defined, is not a sufficient condition for a
consequence relation to be a sensible one with which to handle inconsistent information”.
In this direction, Urbas [32, 345-354] analyses several options. In principle, one wants
a definition of paraconsistency that ensures for any unary placed connective ∗ and any
formulae A, B and C, both A,¬A 0 ∗B and A,¬A 0 B ∗ C.
After all, the underlying philosophical motivation for paraconsistent logics is to avoid
any kind of trivialities from inconsistent premise sets. Then, Urbas [32, p.346] propose that
a theory is ∗-trivial if it contains all expressible sentences having as principal connective.
And using this characterization, one has that a logic L is ∗-paraconsistent if it can support
inconsistent ∗-non-trivial theories.
According to Urbas (1990 p.346), this condition ensures that ∗-connectives “do a better
job of containing the deductive damage caused by inconsistency”.
Obviously some cases with definable connectives like the equivalency, B∗C is B → C and
C → B could determine cases of trivialities like A,¬A 0 B ∗ C. Other potential problems
are cases as A,¬A 0 B → B.
All these examples could show that connection between explosion and triviality is more
complicated that what usually is admitted. Some logics allow some particular cases of
triviality from inconsistent premises that could be tolerated by some paraconsistent logics.
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A further case that generates discussion is pointed out by Barrio, Pailos and Szmuc ([3]).
According to them, the substructural logic TS that lacks valid inferences should be consid-
ered to be a paraconsistent logic. Against this point, Fjellstad considers that the conclusion
that TS is paraconsistent shows that an important (conceptual) aspect of paraconsistency
is missing from the definition connected with the rejection of explosion. According to him,
paraconsistency is linked exclusively with allowing reasoning with inconsistent informa-
tion. The rejection of explosion should be considered as a move to permit contradictions
without trivializing the theory. But this would be the case regarding TS since TS is not
inconsistent. Explosion fails in TS, but this would be a casualty of inconsistency.
But - as Barrio, Szmuc and Pailos reply - the fact that TS has no valid inferences does
not allow one to identify its inferential consequence relation with the empty set. For, in
a certain sense, the fact that TS has no valid inferences is dependent on the language
employed. If we have a constant > representing the value t, and a constant ⊥ representing
the value f, then e.g. the following inferences will be valid in this extension of TS (and,
thus, of the 3-valued Kleene algebra):
>⇒>,⊥ ⇒ ⊥ L ⊥ ⇒>
And, more importantly, the addition of such constants to TS will not imply the validity
of explosion at the inferential level. Therefore, the authors claim, TS is a paraconsistent
logic in a meaningful and non-trivial sense.
However, in this context, it does not matter if we hold that TS is the empty logic or
not. The point seems to persist because we can focus on the logic based on the language
without constants.
Another interesting case, suggested by Francesco Paoli, is to take paraconsistency as an
abstract notion that should not presuppose the concept of negation. So, the question would
be whether it is possible to give an abstract characterization of paraconsistency indepen-
dently of the negation. In the metaleinferential level, one possible way to go is to define
the metainferential notion of paraconsistency regarding invalidating the metainference:
⇒ A A⇒
⇒ B
So, following Paoli, this definition would also have the further advantage of allowing the
formulation of a metainferential version of the dual notion of paracompleteness. However, it
is not clear how - and probably is not possible - to apply this procedure to the basic case of
the explosion at the inferential level. At this level, it does not seem possible to characterize
the rule of explosion without negation.
We think that his variety of definitions is a consequence of the complexity of the problem
of uniquely characterizing the set of paraconsistent logics. In Priest’s words ([18, p.130]):
(...) it seems unlikely that there is any purely formal necessary and sufficient
condition for the spirit of paraconsistency: inconsistent information may
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make a nonsense of a consequence relation in so many, and quite different,
ways.
The aim of this section was to show that the notion of paraconsistency is more complex
than what is usually thought. And it would be really complicated to offer purely formal
conditions for a paraconsistent logic. So, although giving a unique definition of paracon-
sistency, compatible with every account taken in the literature, seems an impossible task,
we found that in every proposal, paraconsistency requires at least the existence of a coun-
terexample to explosion. So, this seems to be the common ground of all of the accounts,
and in this way, we will use this concept in this paper unless there is any clarification.
In the following section, once we present the distinction between pure, applied logics and
philosophical interpretation, we will give further arguments for considering explosion to be
the distinctive feature of praconsistency.
4. Pure and Applied Logics: their philosophical interpretations
In this section, adopting the Priest’s distinction between pure and applied logics, we are
going to analyze what happens with the relation between paraconsistent logical systems
(pure and applied) and their philosophical interpretations. Specifically, we are interested
in rejecting the idea according to which dialetheism should be considered as the canonical
interpretation of some paraconsistent logic. Let’s firstly contrast between pure and applied
logics.
On the one hand, one can be interested in pure systems of logic. In this sense, given
a set of sentences, logic should show us what is follows from these sentences. A good
argument is one whose premises entails its conclusion; its conclusion is a consequence of
its premises. Logic should be very general, abstract and topic-neutral. One should pay
no attention to the subject matter of the sentences: when one is interested in logical
properties, it does not matter what sentences are talking about. It does not matter either
what is known or the epistemic source of the reasons to support a premise. What is only
important is to pay attention to the logical relationship between them. With the proposal
of explaining this notion, one develops several approaches to give a theory of what is
entailed from what. Then, proof-theoretical account tries to explain how to prove something
from something. They can be presented by sequent calculus, natural deduction, axiomatic
systems. These theories have been developed to focus on different aspect of proofs. Pure
logics also can be presented by models. Model theoretical approach tries to explain how
to preserve semantics designated values from semantics values. Set-theoretical models,
plurals models, non-deterministic semantics, partial valuations, Kripke’s models, etc. have
been developed to illuminate the notion of validity. Models and proof are mathematical
instruments to understand the concept of consequence. Generally speaking, soundness and
completeness are properties that pure systems should have. In this sense, any evaluation of a
pure logic is based on the fulfillment of those properties. The search for results of soundness
and completeness is a central goal at this level. The deduction and the cut-elimination
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theorems, the interpolation results, the compactness of models and the decidability of a
system of proof are fundamentals elements to evaluate a pure logic 5
In Priest’s words:
First, there are numerous pure logics. This point I take to be relatively un-
contentious. There are the many-valued logics that Lukasiewicz invented,
not to mention others such as intuitionism, quantum logic, and paraconsis-
tent logic (one of which, LP, we met in the preceding sections). Possibly, a
purist might say that they are not logics since they are not the real logic.
But that would be like saying that non-Euclidean geometries are not geome-
tries since they are not the real geometry. In both cases we have a family of
structures (logics or geometries) that are perfectly well-defined mathemati-
cal structures; and, as far as that goes, all on a par. [21, p. 164-165]
On the other hand, one can be interested in the theoretical applications of logic6. Accord-
ing to this proposal, logics can be applied to several domains. Their domains of applications
range from computer science and artificial intelligence, electrical circuits to the grammar
of natural languages. There are several logics that can be applied to a given domain -
although a given logic is usually more adequate to certain domains than to others.
For example, according to Bueno [9, p.542],
both classical logic and paraconsistent logic can be applied to consistent
domains, and typically they will generate the same results there. However,
once we move to inconsistent domains, classical logic is no longer an ade-
quate option (unless we want to allow the arbitrary rejection of some bits
of information about such domains). After all, by identifying inconsistency
and triviality, classical logic precludes the possibility that, in inconsistent
domains, we fail to validly infer at least one sentence of the language we
use.
As regards applied logic, one could be interested in which of the infinitely many paracon-
sistent logics is the right one. In this regard, there are at least two options. First, one could
support the idea that the answer depends on the kind of inconsistency which we are dealing
with. Maybe more of only one logic might have a nice application. Second, one could claim
that there is only one canonical application for a logic. This is Priest’s view. The canonical
application of logic is namely the reasoning in natural language. Then, according to Priest
[20], only canonical pluralism provides an interesting case for logical pluralism. After all,
pure logical pluralism and theoretical pluralism only claim that there are different logics-
an undeniable, but ultimately uninteresting, mathematical fact.
5Richard Routley has linked this factor with the question about the adequacy of a logic. According to
him, there are some internal systemic reasons (for instance, in [28, p.318] he says: “Among the questions of
adequacy that arise for the dialectical theories outlined, a most important initial one is: Are the theories
non-trivial?”).
6Richard Routley has also accepted that there are some external reasons that allow for evaluating the
adequacy of a logic: for example, [28, p.305],“if a logic practically can fulfill the most important business
of furnishing a logical basis for naïve dialectical set theory and for semantically closed natural languages”.
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Nevertheless, according to Priest and as opposed to Bueno[U+FFFD] view, as applied
logics, classical and paraconsistent logics cannot both be right. As is well known, classical
logics and paraconsistent logics seem to disagree with the notion of negation. In this regard,
the main question is: What kind of restrictions does negation put on any theory about
negation? From Priest’s view, when a system of logic is going to be understood as applied
logic, then a theory about negation has a specific subject matter. Negation only can be a
theory about a contradictory forming operator. So, any account of negation that fails in
delivering a contradictory forming operator is not eligible as a true account of negation. And
concerning logical pluralism at the level of applied logics, this means that the restrictions
on negation allow that only one logic could be applied correctly to the inferences we make
in natural language.
To summarize the discussion: there are pure and applied logics. There are infinitely
many pure logics. There are a lot of different applications. But maybe, if Priest is right,
only one is the canonical (the human reasoning) and only one pure system can be applied
to this domain.
In any case, the main question is whether there is the possibility of imposing enough
formal constraints on a pure logic in such a way that when we apply it to the inferences we
make in language, a single philosophical interpretation is determined.
It is clear that one can use philosophical interpretations to try to obtain additional
understanding of certain pure logical theories (from a proof-theoretical or model-theoretical
point of view). It is also true that at least in some cases pure logics are developed to
find an answer to a philosophical interpretation. For example, pure modal logics have
been motivated by our interest in explaining what is metaphysically necessary or possible.
Nevertheless, we would like to argue that there are no intrinsic connections between pure
logics and one standard philosophical interpretation, even when one is considering these
systems applied to human reasoning.
The opposite point of view has various representatives. For example, David Lewis seems
to be someone who holds a canonical philosophical interpretation thesis for pure modal
logics. According to him, modal logics talk about real possible worlds (see [14]). We
oppose this approach. We would like to draw attention to the fact that one can use Kripke-
models to represent epistemic states of informational scenarios. Or one may be interested
in what is obligatory or permitted and use Kripke-models to talk about acceptable worlds.
But, similar structures can be used to give the models for intuitionistic logic. Here one can
understand these structures as talking about constructive proofs. So, at this point, there is
no possibility of adding sufficient restrictions to the theoretical model apparatus that are
capable of fixing a single intended philosophical interpretation.
Let us emphasize the point with another example: it is well known that truth values can
be interpreted in different ways in the Weak Kleene WK3 matrix: the intermediate value can
be interpreted as being meaningless (Bochvar’s interpretation) or as being off-topic (Beall’s
interpretation). Moreover, several works about how to analyze paraconsistent Weak Kleene
have recently been published. All of them are examples that involve the systems and show
how these features could determine one or more interpretations.
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Nevertheless, some philosophers and logicians have adopted the opposite point of view.
They have supported the idea that there are ontological or epistemological consequences
arising from adopting some pure systems. Another example seems to be TimothyWilliamson.
He has supported Classical Logic because of this system talks (canonically) about absolute
generality. He thinks of a logical theory as a theory of unrestricted generalizations. These
generalizations are not specifically about properties of arguments, sentences, propositions;
they are generalizations about absolutely all things in the world ([33]). Michael Dummett
has adopted a similar approach. From his point of view, classical logic necessarily has on-
tological commitments; it is committed to metaphysical realism. The use of classical logic
in a realm of discourse commits one to realism concerning that discourse. Pure paraconsis-
tent logics are not an exception to this point. For example, analyzing the pure dialectical
paraconsistent logic DM, Routley and Meyer affirm:
Whereas intuitionism rejects the negation principle ¬¬A → A dialectical
logic DM retains (this principle) but rejects, what intuitionism keeps, A→
¬¬A. These formal differences derive from deeper semantical differences, in
that whereas intuitionists regard the real world 0 as incomplete (as concerns
non-finitary matters) dialecticians take 0 to be inconsistent (beyond local
stable regions). ([30, p. 10-11])
This view seems to assume that the logics DM and intuitionistic logic are directly con-
nected with different views about the real world. The idea is that adopting one of the two
systems leads directly to two opposing conceptions about the world. We want to reject this
thesis.
Of course, there are different philosophical ways of interpreting pure paraconsistent log-
ics. Maybe our evidence is inconsistent and one is interested in reasoning under these
conditions. Perhaps one has confirmatory and refutatory evidence for a hypothesis. But,
of course, dialetheism is another philosophical interpretation for pure paraconsistent logics.
And we are not rejecting the possibility of giving a philosophical interpretation of some
paraconsistent logic that adopts dialetheia. This seems to be Priest’s point of view and we
are not criticizing this approach ([22, p. 67]):
So far I have argued that the mere failure of truth of a sentence is sufficient
ground for the truth of its negation; that is, that truth and falsity are mutu-
ally exhaustive. The next question is whether they are mutually exclusive.
This is obviously the question of whether dialetheism is true, which I have
already answered positively in the first part of the book: some sentences are
both true and false.
What we are going to reject is that there is a single canonical philosophical interpretation
for some pure paraconsistent logic even when one is interested in the standard application
of pure logics: the reasoning in natural languages.
So, once the distinction between pure, applied logics and philosophical interpretations
were made, we can go back to the definition of paraconsistency. We want to stress the
following: paraconsistency is a formal property of some formal system. In the same way
as consistency and inconsistency are usually ascribed to formal systems, i.e. it is possible
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to formally define Post-consistency and negation-consistency, we find that paraconsistency
must be defined using some formal method. So as we’ve seen in the previous section,
Urbas [32], among others, tries to define paraconsistency as being capable of supporting
inconsistent information. However, this is not what we should look at when seeking a formal
definition for the pure logic, but when we are looking for an application for some pure
logic; in other words, defining paraconsistency as the possibility of supporting inconsistent
theories, as Urbas seems to do, confuses pure logic with applied logic. Because of this, we
will stick to what we claimed in the last paragraph of the last section, and we will take the
failure of explosion as the distinctive note of paraconsistency. Again, this is not the same
as supporting inconsistent theories; the first one is a characteristic of the pure logic, the
second one is an application of the logic.
In the next section, we will show that not only have pure and applied logics been con-
fused, but also pure/applied logic with philosophical interpretations. So, dialetheism is one
possible philosophical interpretation of some pure logics, as LP.
5. From paraconsistency to dialetheism
As mentioned before, many theorists have thought that the formal notion of paracon-
sistency requires or calls for the semantical/ontological, depending on the interpretation,
notion of dialetheism. The main proposal of this section is to argue against this thesis. So,
we support the idea that pure paraconsistent logics do not necessarily imply a dialetheic
interpretation. There is no intrinsic feature, e.g. in LP as pure logic, that allows for the
establishing of a dialetheic interpretation as its canonical interpretation. In the following,
we will use LP as the paradigmatic paraconsistent logic, but the idea can be generalized
to any paraconsistent logic. So, let us begin by introducing the propositional fragment of
the logic LP:
Definition 5.1. The Logic of Paradox LP is the three-valued logic induced by the matrix
〈VLP,DLP,OLP〉, where the set of semantic values is VLP = {t, i, f}, the set of designated





f∧LP t i f
t t i f
i i i f
f f f f
f∨LP t i f
t t t t
i t i i
f t i f
other derived connectives, such as →, are defined as usual.
So, this is a three-valued presentation of LP. However, so far, this is a pure logic. If
we identify a logic with the set of valid inferences, this pure logic can be presented in
different ways. In particular, LP can be introduced by relation semantics, tableaux, or
sequent-calculus, among others. Of course, by definition, in all of them, the same validities
hold. This means that same results can be obtained independently of the special features
of the way logics are presented. So, It cannot be argued that what makes a logic like LP
intrinsically dialetheic is the philosophical interpretation of the third value in a three-valued
presentation. There is no intrinsically dialetheic value for LP. This is so because there are
two-valued LP-models, i.e. two-valued presentations of LP (using relational semantics).
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Secondly, even if we focus on the trivalent presentation, the intermediate value might be
interpreted in a non-dialetheic fashion. In other words, to admit three-valued semantics
does not compel us to interpret the intermediate semantic value, this pure value, in any
particular way.
Of course, one could reply to our position by noting that, although it is correct regard-
ing the relationship between pure logic and its links to philosophical interpretations, the
situation is completely different when it fixes the context of an application.
In particular, when we deal with paradoxical sentences, such as the liar sentence:
The sentence λ is false(λ)
three-valued presentations of LP allow to assigning the intermediate value to λ and its
negation, in every model. Thus, one could believe that this sentence (and, of course, its
negation) is a glut: true and false in every model, a dialetheia.
Certainly, we are not arguing against dialetheic interpretations of LP. Indeed, we are not
rejecting that the idea the pure logic LP applies to the reasoning that involves the truth
predicate of the natural languages and can be philosophically interpreted by dialetheia.
Our point is that although perfectly possible, it is not necessary. There are other ways
to philosophically interpret the third value of the pure system LP even when one applies
this system to semantic paradoxes. For example, it is perfectly possible to avoid any
commitments with dialetheia by adopting an interpretation that involves two forms of
assertion: strict and tolerant. According to this interpretation, strictly, the liar and other
paradoxical sentences cannot be asserted; but, tolerantly, they can. The same goes for their
negations.
Moreover, stressing this point, in [5], Beall and Ripley have offered an analetheic (truth-
value gaps) interpretation for LP. In fact, they take LP and show how to accommodate
a truth predicate. From the analetheic point of view, paradoxical sentences lack truth-
value. So, what the authors claim is that it is perfectly possible to give a parallel non-
dialetheic version of LP that enjoys similar positive properties, when dealing with semantic
vocabulary.
Our points should be taken into account to evaluate some current discussions on the
connections between paraconsistency and dialetheism. For example, recently, Beziau in [8]
has argued that LP commits the dialetheist to trivialism. According to him, firstly “any
atomic formula S [in LP] is a dialetheia” ([8, p. 52]) and, secondly, “every molecular formula
is a dialetheia” in LP ([8, p. 54]). Nevertheless, Martin in [15, p.11] has replied that:
“all Beziau has shown is that every formula in LP is a dialetheia in an inter-
pretation, which in principle is no different to showing that the proposition
‘Barack Obama is a fried egg’ is true in some interpretations in classical
logic. Neither entail truth simpliciter. To show that LP commits the di-
aletheist to all formulae being dialetheia would require showing that in every
interpretation in which some formula is a dialetheia, every formula is a di-
aletheia. Yet, this is trivially not true of LP, for it is a paraconsistent
logic”
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Obviously, Martin is right about the trivialism point. But both are wrongly supporting
the thesis that we are rejecting: there is an only one canonical interpretation for LP. Our
point is that there is nothing intrinsic to LP that connects this pure logic with a single
philosophical interpretation (dialetheism).
Another reason that we would like to give against the one logic, one canonical philo-
sophical interpretation is the following: LP and all other subclassical logics allow for the
recapturing of classical logic through operators and other mechanisms (Barrio [1] , JC Beall
[4, pp. 755-764] and Omori [17]). As Omori claims [17, p.117]: “LP is not dialetheic since
it is a subsystem of classical logic”.
We should be impressed by translations between logics. This is a general phenomenon.
And it is a remarkable result that CL can be expressed inside some non-classical logics: its
rules and laws can be captured as acceptable under certain conditions. This is the case with
LP. Most paraconsistent logicians do not propose a wholesale rejection ofCL. They usually
accept the validity of classical inferences in consistent contexts. CL is recovered inside this
system only taking into consideration only classical values and classical definition of validity
as truth preservation. In this way, one can captureCL inside LP for some contexts. Besides,
classical negation is definable in LP adding a consistency operator ◦7. Recovering classical
negation inside LP seems to allow different philosophical interpretations for the same pure
system. Therefore, it seems that it is necessary to say that LP cannot be really interpreted
as capturing the idea that there are true contradictions.
Finally, one could be interested in adding some conditions to LP to avoid this last
result. Omori in [17] presents a new paraconsistent logic by expanding LP. The new logic,
referred to as dLP (dialetheic LP), is obtained by combining connectives from different
views of paraconsistency (connexive logics and LFIs). This pure logic has some interesting
distinctive features. As Omori shows the propositional fragment of dLP is Post complete.
Let us present the propositional fragment of this logic.
Definition 5.2. dLP is the three-valued logic induced by the matrix 〈VdLP,
DdLP,OdLP〉, where the set of semantic values is VdLP = {t, i, f}, the set of designated ones








f∧dLP t i f
t t i f
i i i f
f f f f
f∨dLP t i f
t t t t
i t i i
f t i f
f→dLP t i f
t t i f
i t i f
f i i i
It is worth noting that ◦ is a recovery or consistency operator, which means that dLP
is an LFI. Also, the other distinctive feature, compared with LP is that implication is
7Roughly speaking, using common self-referential mechanisms, this result is possible only if the language
does not have its own truth predicate. But as Barrio, Pailos and Szmuc point out in [2], this result could
change by adopting Goodship’s project. In this case, it is possible to add a consistency operator to LP and
define a classical negation in a language with transparent truth.
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expressed via a primitive connective. It is clear that dLP is not subclassical. Hence, unlike
LP, dLP could be a good candidate to be dialetheic.
Nevertheless, even though dLP is not subclassical, we want to emphasize at this point
that this result is not sufficient to have only one canonical philosophical interpretation. Even
the logical resources are compatible with dialetheias, the pure system is also compatible
with an epistemic interpretation concerning contradictory evidence. That is, not even dLP
can capture only one dialetheic interpretation.
6. From dialetheism to paraconsistency
In Section 2 we presented the definition of dialetheism, and, in a nutshell, it was defined
as accepting true contradictions (either from an ontological point of view or a semantical
one, or both). On the other hand, in Section 3 we summarized many possible definitions of
paraconsistency.The moral of that discussion is that, whatever a parconsistent logic may be,
a logic is paraconsistent only if it fails to validate the rule of explosion, i.e. A,¬A 2 B, for
some formulae A, B. In other words, if a logic validates explosion it is not paraconsistent
at all. Also, negation plays a crucial role in this formulation of paraconsistency; it seems
impossible for a logic to be paraconsistent and to lack some negation. So far, in the litera-
ture, dialetheism has usually been related with paraconsistency. Thus, many philosophers
have considered it impossible to be dialetheist and not to accept a paraconsistent logic.
Just for giving a recent example, Omori claims in [17, p. 112]:
As is well known, paraconsistent logics are independent of dialetheism in
general. More specifically, dialetheism calls for paraconsistent logic, but not
the other way around.
So, as we argued earlier, we agree with Omori when he claims that paraconsistent logic
does not require a dialetheic interpretation.
However, in this section, we will show that it is possible to embrace contradictions in a
non-paraconsistent frame. In order to do so, we will give some examples of this thesis. In
particular, with the development of substructural logics, we find examples of logics that can
possibly accept contradictions, and at the same time accepting the principle of explosion.
One of these logics is ST, developed in [25],[10], [26]. Let us first introduce a sequent
calculus for the logic ST.
Definition 6.1. (ST) Let Γ, ∆, Π, and Σ be (finite) sets of formulas, let φ and ψ be











Γ, φ, ψ ⇒ ∆
L∧
Γ, φ ∧ ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φ Σ⇒ Π, ψ
R∧
Γ,Σ⇒ ∆,Π, φ ∧ ψ
Γ, φ⇒ ∆ Σ, ψ ⇒ Π
L∨
Γ,Σφ ∨ ψ ⇒ Π,∆
Γ, φ, ψ ⇒ ∆
R∨






Using this logic, Ripley [25] has shown that it’s possible to build a transparent theory of
truth, avoiding triviality8. So, let us introduce this theory:
Definition 6.2. (STTT ) Let Γ and ∆ be (finite) sets of formulas, let φ be a formula, and







In this theory, we can express the liar sentence. So we will take the sentence λ to be
equivalent to ¬Tr(pλq), i.e. λ says about itself that it’s not true. With this sentence in
play, we can prove ⇒ Tr(pλq) and ⇒ ¬Tr(pλq), as follows:
Id
Tr(pλq)⇒ Tr(pλq)










8We assume some way of achieving self-reference. For instance, we can get a stock of distinguished constants
that are interpreted in the same way in every model and work as names of the sentences. Notationally,
we will take pφq to be the name of the sentence φ. It’s not possible to give all the details here, so we
recommend the reader to see, for instance, [25].
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Therefore, in this theory we can explicitly represent a dialetheia, i.e. we prove that a
sentence is true and false (since we can identify its falsity with the negation of its truth).
Moreover, this theory seems to be a good candidate for those who support some kind of
semantical dialetheism, because the truth predicate allows for expressing the main thesis
of this position. It is worth pointing out that the way of avoiding triviality from this is the
rejection of the rule of Cut:
Γ⇒ φ,∆ Π, φ⇒ Σ
Cut
Γ,Π⇒ ∆,Σ
So, Cut is not admissible on pain of triviality. On the other hand, since the base logic of







for any pair of formulae of the language φ and ψ.
Therefore, we have a dialetheic theory that is not paraconsistent. Not only that, but
with STTT it’s possible to be committed to the so-called “semantical dialetheism”, and not
necessarily to ontological dialetheism.
However, although we have presented a theory adding a truth predicate over a non-
paraconsistent logic that allows a dialetheist interpretation, some people could find the way
of doing it to be suspicious, especially since we are not working with a logic strictu sensu
but with a theory. So, in what follows, we also will show that a logic can be compatible
with a dialetheist intepretation and be non-paraconsistent.
The logic we will work with is an extension of ST with a constant λ9:
Definition 6.3. (STλ) Let Γ and ∆ be (finite) sets of formulas, let φ be a formula. The












9For this constant, we use the same letter as the liar sentence, since the intended interpretation of this
constant is a contradictory object, such as the liar sentence.
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Id
λ⇒ λR λ ⇒ λ
Of course, STλ is not trivial, since explicitly rejects the rule of Cut:
Γ⇒ φ,∆ Π, φ⇒ Σ
Cut
Γ,Π⇒ ∆,Σ
So, the logic is perfectly compatible with a dialetheist position. However, the logic is not







In this way, it seems that dialetheism doesn’t call for paraconsistency.
As we have seen in Section 3, every definition of paraconsistency shares the rejection of
explosion. And, STTT and STλ validate the rule of explosion. So, both logics are clearly
non-paraconsistent.
Finally, let’s mention that recently, Barrio, Pailos and Szmuc ([3]) have proposed a gen-
eralization of the notion of paraconsistency. They analyze the meta-inferential formulation
of Explosion (Meta-Explosion):
⇒ A ⇒ ¬AMeta-Explosion ⇒ B
Therefore, the idea is to define paraconsistency in terms of failure of Explosion or Meta-
Explosion. According to this view, it is possible to have logics which have a non-uniform
policy towards paraconsistency. For instance, STλ would be paraconsistent at the metain-
ferential level, but non-paraconsistent at the inferential level. In any case, again, usual
definitions of paraconsistency focus on the inferential level (the level of the logic, so to say)
and the inferential version of Explosion is valid in STλ10.
10It is not our aim to close the discussion of this section with a categorical assertion on how to define
paraconsistency, but rather to conditionalize our claims to the usual and at certain extent accepted minimal
criteria used to determine whether a logic is or not paraconsistent, i.e. failure of explosion (see Section 3
for details). Under this criterion none of the logics presented above is paraconsistent.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued against the existence of any essential relationship between
pure/applied paraconsistent logics and their philosophical interpretations. In particular,
we tried to show that paraconsistency and dialetheism are not so intrinsically connected
as usually assumed. In order to do so, we firstly reviewed the most important attempts
to define dialetheism and paraconsistency. This led us to one of the problems of our task:
there is no consensus about how to define paraconsistency. However, what we found that
common to almost every proposal is the rejection of the inferential rule of explosion.
Next, we argued against the idea that there is a single canonical philosophical inter-
pretation for some pure logic, focusing on the dialetheist interpretation of paraconsistent
logics. In this sense, in order to strengthen the point, using LP as the paradigmatic ex-
ample of a paraconsistent logic, we have shown that it is perfectly possible to adopt a
paraconsistent logic and reject dialetheism. Moreover, we presented two examples in order
to justify the other direction of the implication: it’s possible to be a dialetheist and to
adopt a non-paraconsistent logic.
As a concluding remark, we want to emphasize that, contrary to what a first view of
this paper might suggest, it was not our aim to criticize dialetheism in general or some
philosophical interpretation of some particular paraconsistent logic. In fact, we consider
dialetheism to be a plausible philosophical interpretation of LP. Our point was just to
argue that this relation is not as close as many theorists have claimed.
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